The second volume of the U.S. Army in the Iraq War series, Surge and Withdrawal 2007-2011, provides a comprehensive and detailed account of the United States' military involvement in Iraq during this period. Written by various authors, the book offers a wealth of information and analysis on the surge of U.S. forces in 2007, as well as the subsequent withdrawal which began in 2011.

The book delves into the complexities of the Iraq War, examining the strategic decisions made by military leaders, the challenges faced by soldiers on the ground, and the impact of the conflict on Iraqi civilians. The authors provide a balanced and nuanced view of the war, highlighting both the successes and failures of the U.S. Army's efforts in Iraq.

One of the strengths of Surge and Withdrawal is its attention to detail and its use of firsthand accounts from soldiers who served in Iraq. These personal stories add depth and emotion to the narrative, allowing readers to better understand the experiences of those who fought in the war.

Overall, Surge and Withdrawal is a valuable addition to the literature on the Iraq War, offering a thorough and thought-provoking examination of this complex and controversial conflict. Whether you are a scholar, a veteran, or simply someone interested in understanding the history of U.S. military involvement in Iraq, this book is a must-read.

Book Description:
The Iraq War has been the costliest U.S. conflict since the Vietnam War. To date, few official studies have been conducted to review what happened, why it happened, and what lessons should be drawn. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the Army’s initial operational level analysis of this conflict, written in narrative format, with assessments and lessons embedded throughout the work. This study reviews the conflict from a Landpower perspective and includes the contributions of coalition allies, the U.S. Marine Corps, and special operations forces. Presented principally from the point of view of the commanders in Baghdad, the narrative examines the interaction of the operational and strategic levels, as well as the creation of theater level strategy and its implementation at the tactical level. Volume 1 begins in the truce tent at Safwan Airfield in southern Iraq at the end of Operation DESERT STORM and briefly examines actions by U.S. and Iraqi forces during the interwar years. The narrative continues by examining the road to war, the initially successful invasion, and the rise of Iraqi insurgent groups before exploring the country’s slide toward civil war. This volume concludes with a review of the decision by the George W. Bush administration to “surge” additional forces to Iraq, and reviews the conduct of the “surge” and its aftermath.

This study was constructed over a span of 4 years and relied on nearly 30,000 pages of handpicked declassified documents, hundreds of hours of original interviews, and thousands of hours of previously unavailable interviews. Original interviews conducted by the team included President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretaries of Defense Leon Panetta and Robert Gates, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every theater commander for the war, among many others. With its release, this publication, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, represents the U.S. Government’s longest and most detailed study of the Iraq conflict thus far. - Summary from the text